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Strung Up or Shot Down?: The Death Penalty in Hong Kong
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Andrew Scobell*
I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty has long been viewed as the most severe form of pun-
ishment any society can inflict on a person found guilty of a criminal
offense. The severity is tempered by the fact that many countries have
reduced the number of crimes that carry the death penalty. Few states,
however, have gone so far as to abolish its use altogether:1 the death
penalty is still retained by the majority of governments in the world and
enjoys healthy use by the judicial systems in the bulk of these states.
Today, while capital punishment officially remains an option to
courts in Hong Kong, no one has been executed in the territory for more
than 20 years. Since 1966 individuals sentenced to death have had this
punishment commuted to life imprisonment. In China, however, the
death penalty currently enjoys extensive usage. 2
This article addresses the implications the death penalty in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") law may have for the
territory's citizens. First it is pertinent to ask if the HKSAR will contain
provisions for capital punishment in its criminal law. Presently the death
penalty is retained in the legal systems of both Hong Kong and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China ("PRC"). The draft agreement signed in Decem-
ber 1984 by London and Beijing specifies that the current legal system
shall be "maintained" until 2047.1 Thus, criminal law statutes and pro-
cedures, including those pertaining to the death penalty, should remain
* Research Assistant, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C.; M.A., University of Washington, 1986; B.A., Whitman College, 1982.
I As of 1979 some fifteen states reportedly no longer employ capital punishment. See AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 130 (1979)
[hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY].
2 This is one of the chief areas of concern about human rights violations in China expressed by
Amnesty International. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1
(1984) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS].
3 A DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG, Sept. 1984, Misc. No. 20, Cmnd
9352 (1984) (British White Paper containing the Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366.
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unchanged. If any changes occur in Hong Kong's criminal justice sys-
tem after 1997, they will be in the direction of the system operating in the
PRC. Accordingly, attention should focus on the extent to which capital
punishment would be viable after sovereignty transfers in 1997.
Before the death penalty in post-1997 Hong Kong can be assessed,
its current status in both the territory and the PRC must be considered.
First, rationales for the use of capital punishment are examined and
crimes that carry the death penalty in the respective administrative enti-
ties are surveyed. Legal procedures associated with capital punishment
and actual use of the death penalty in both Hong Kong and China are
considered. Finally, implications for post-1997 law are discussed.
II. RATIONALES FOR, AND CRIMES THAT CARRY,
THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Hong Kong
Capital punishment for a small number of particularly grave crimes
in British law rests on its deterrence value. Punishment is retribution in
that it avenges the wrong suffered by the victim(s); it also registers the
state's disapproval of serious crimes.4 The death penalty emphasizes the
severity of those infractions a society considers most abhorrent.
Currently, three crimes carry the death penalty in Hong Kong:
murder, treason and "piracy with violence." Murder is traditionally de-
fined in British law as "when a man of sound memory and the age of
discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, under the
King's peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied by the
law, the death taking place within a year and a day."5 One is considered
to have committed murder if 1) the general intent was to kill, 2) death
occurred as a result of an intent to commit grevious bodily harm, or 3) if
one intentionally committed an act from which death would likely
result.6
A person commits treason by "imprisoning or restraining," wound-
ing or killing the British sovereign. In addition, anyone who "levies war
against Her Majesty" or assists either the enemy during time of war, or
foreigners to invade British territory, is guilty of treason.7
The crime of "piracy with violence" refers specifically to piracy at
sea. Section 119 of the Crimes Ordinance states: "Any person who with
4 There is, however, no way to conclusively prove or disprove the deterrence value of capital
punishment. Further, many feel that retribution is a "primitive" concept that has no place in mod-
em society. See, e.g., ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT 17-24.
5 Id. at 26.
6 Id. at 28. Murder is listed as a capital offense in Offenses Against the Person, Laws of Hong
Kong, ch. 212, § 2 (rev. ed. 1972).
7 Id. ch. 200, § 2 [hereinafter Crimes Ordinance].
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intent to commit or at the time of or immediately before or immediately
after committing the offense of piracy in respect of any vessel: a) assaults
with intent to murder any person on board of or belonging to the vessel;
or b) wounds any such person; or c) unlawfully does any act by which
the life of any such person may be endangered, shall be guilty of an of-
fense and on conviction upon indictment shall be sentenced to death."'
B. China
The death penalty rests in an interesting niche, representing a
unique contradiction in Marxist-Leninist legal philosophy: no possibility
of reform for a convicted criminal. Communist theoreticians tend to
stress the reformist and reeducational goals of socialist legal codes. In
the Soviet Union, upon whose legal system the PRC is based, death pen-
alty regulations are conspicuous: theirs is a treatment separate from the
main body of punishments available under the law.9 This ideological di-
lemma in socialist legal doctrine is further illustrated by the fact that the
Soviet Union has thrice abolished and then reintroduced the death pe-
anlty since 1917. The death penalty was most recently reinstituted in
1950 and may be imposed for 18 different offenses in peacetime."°
The rationale in post-1949 Chinese law for the retention of the death
penalty is that in the short term it is a necessary tool of a socialist govern-
ment. One authoritative Chinese legal publication stated in 1957, "[w]e
are retaining the death penalty while in the process of gradually abolish-
ing it, and we are reducing the scope of the application of the death pen-
alty to a minimum. But at present we are still using this punishment.""1
Capital punishment is vital when "death alone can satisfy the peo-
ple's anger," 2 and, according to the publication, "if the death penalty
were not applied, state law and discipline could not be dignified, social
justice could not be extended, and the anger of the masses could not be
pacified." 13 Most authoritative statements on the subject stress that capi-
tal punishment is a temporary expedient needed to deal with only the
most serious threats to the survival of the socialist system,1 4 or those that
8 Id. § 19.
9 L. Lipsen, Execution: Hallmark of "Socialist Legality", PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Sept.-
Oct. 1962, at 23.
10 Id. at 21-26. But see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at
130-39.
11 L. MENG, C. YU-HUANG, C. TSE-CHIEH, & L. CHIEH, CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO-
KUO HSING-FA TSUNG-TSE CHIANG-YI, [Lectures on General Principles of Criminal Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China], reprinted in COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 538 (1968).
12 COHEN, supra note 11, at 535.
13 Id. at 536.
14 See, eg., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
2, at 77-78.
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have greatly "aroused the people's anger," 5 and emphasize the "hu-
mane" nature of PRC law.16 The Chinese government claims its crime
crackdown since 1983 has resulted in a substantial drop in the crime
rate-by about one third according to one official."7
Nothing points to imminent abolition of capital punishment; on the
contrary, usage of the death penalty in China appears to be escalating.
In a January 1986 speech, Deng Xiaoping told the Standing Committee
of the Communist Party Politburo that, "the death penalty cannot be
abolished, and some criminals must be sentenced to death."1 " He called
execution, "one of the indispensable means of education" available to
Chinese authorities. If anything, Deng reportedly said, the courts are
"too soft on criminals." He called for the death penalty for recidivists,
corrupt officials who cost the state serious financial losses, managers of
brothels and "some of those" who, "play on people's superstitions or
who organize reactionary secret societies."
Still, the Beijing government is sensitive to foreign criticism of
China's widespread use of the death penalty. A 1984 article in People's
Daily noted, "Some foreign bourgeois 'humanitarians' object to our con-
demning those felons to the death penalty, holding that such practice is
'inhumane.' However, can it be considered 'humane' if we just stop con-
demning those felons to death but let them continue to kill good
people?" 19
Presently, forty-four crimes in the PRC are punishable by death.
15 COHEN, supra note 11, at 538.
16 See, e.g., People's Daily, Sept. 28, 1959 (article by the Minister of Public Security). The
Minister wrote:
Among the criminal punishments of our country there is one which prescribes, "sentencing
to death, suspending execution of sentence for two years, compelling labor, and observing
the consequences." Imperialists have denounced this as the great cruelty. We say this is
the greatest humaneness. The criminals themselves understand this. Sentencing them to
death and suspending execution of their sentence gives these persons, allowed to live under
the sword of the people's government, a last opportunity to reform. In fact most of the
criminals who are dealt with this way are spared. Where was there ever in ancient or
modem times, in China or abroad, so great an innovation? Where could one find in the
capitalist world so humane a law?
Id., reprinted in COHEN, supra note 11, at 539.
17 Anti-Crime Drive Jails 624,000 Since 1983 (Hong Kong AFP, Nov. 9, 1986) in FOREIGN
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, CHINA DAILY REPORT [hereinafter FBIS], Nov. 10, 1986, at
K2.
18 Deng appears to be echoing the words of Mao Zedong. According to a law textbook pub-
lished in 1986, Mao said, "[w]e must insist on a few executions, while strictly guarding against
indiscriminate executions." WUHAN UNIVERSITY LAW DEP'T, FAXUE ZHISHI; SHOUCE, [Hand-
book of Legal Studies] (3d ed. 1986), at 217. All of the quotes in this paragraph come from a new
published collection of Deng's speeches. See Southerland, Chinese Police Execute 8 Criminals in One
Day: More Expected as Party Congress Nears, Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1987, at A17.
19 Zhou Jianren Discusses Cracking Down on Criminals, People's Daily, Jan. 18, 1984, in FBIS,
Jan. 23, 1984 at K7.
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Twenty-one of these are set out in the Criminal Code of 1979. Further
legislation since then includes twenty-three more offenses punishable by
death. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China adopted by
the National People's Congress in July 1979 made fourteen counterrevo-
lutionary crimes and seven ordinary crimes punishable by death.2 °
1. Counterrevolutionary crimes
"Counterrevolutionary crimes" are defined as "all acts endangering
the PRC committed with the goal of overthrowing the political power of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system."21 These
crimes are roughly analogous to "treasonable offenses" in Western coun-
tries.22 Mao Zedong clearly felt that counterrevolutionaries posed a seri-
ous threat to the consolidation of the infant Chinese communist state,
and in the years following the founding of the PRC, many counterrevolu-
tionaries were "rooted out," and "some were sentenced to death."23
While Mao believed this step had been "absolutely necessary" in order to
fully free the masses from "long years of oppression," by 1957 he be-
lieved the "bulk" of counterrevolutionary elements on the mainland had
been "eliminated."2 4 Twenty-two years later, however, Deng Xiaoping
reported that dangerous counterrevolutionaries still existed, in addition
to "enemy agents, criminals and other bad elements of all kinds who
undermine socialist public order."2" PRC officials have estimated that
counterrevolutionaries comprise 1% or 2% of the population.26
Fourteen counterrevolutionary infractions carry the death penalty if
circumstances are "especially serious" or "odious".27 These crimes in-
clude colluding "with foreign states in plotting to harm the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and security of the motherland" (article 91); plotting
to "subvert the government or dismember the state" (article 92); incite-
ment of state employees to defect or rebel (article 93); defection (article
20 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
56-57.
21 The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 90 [hereinafter Criminal Law of
China], reprinted in THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF CHINA (1984)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE OF CHINA] (published by the Foreign Languages
Press in Beijing).
22 This analogy was also drawn by a senior official in China's Bureau of Reform Through
Labor during an interview with an Agence France Presse reporter. Anti-Crime Drive Jails 624,000
Since 1983, supra note 17, at Kl-K2.
23 On Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, in 5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSE-TUNG 397 (1977).
24 Id.
25 Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982)
166 (1984).
26 Anti-Crime Drive Jails 624000 Since 1983, supra note 17, at K1.
27 Criminal Law of China, art. 103.
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94); organizing an "armed mass rebellion" (article 95); organizing a
"mass prison raid" or jailbreak (article 96); espionage or supplying "mili-
tary material" to the enemy (article 97); sabotage to public buildings or
installations; hijacking; stealing "state records" and other items of public
property; manufacturing or stealing weapons and ammunition; "pointing
out bombing or shelling targets to the enemy" (article 100); murder or
injury by poisoning or attempting to do so (article 101).28
2. Crimes endangering public security, infringing on personal
rights, violating property and disrupting social order
Crimes endangering public security and punishable by death in the
Criminal Law of 1979 include setting fires, breaching dikes, causing ex-
plosions, spreading poison, or "other dangerous means" causing serious
injury, death or "major losses" to property (article 106); sabotaging
transportation equipment, electrical power or gas equipment "causing se-
rious consequences" (article 110).21
Two crimes "infringing upon the rights of the person" listed in the
1979 law carry the death sentence. These include "intentional murder"
(article 132); and rape-if the victim is under age 14, or if the act is
"especially serious" or if the victim is injured or killed (article 139).30
The law lists two property infringements that carry the death pen-
alty. These include stealing in "serious" circumstances or stealing which
causes the injury or death of a person (article 150); and in "serious" cases
of corruption involving state personnel where "huge" amounts of state
property are concerned (article 155).31 In addition, one crime of "dis-
rupting the order of social administration:" intentionally sabotaging
boundary markers along the borders "for the purpose of treason" carries
the death penalty (article 175).32
Amendments were introduced when the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress passed the "Decision on the Severe Punish-
ment of Criminal Elements Who Seriously Endanger Public Security" in
September 1983. This measure added seven new offenses: "criminal
hooligan activities" by ringleaders of "criminal hooligan groups" or
others who cause "especially serious harm"; assault and battery; organiz-
ing a "counter-revolutionary" secret society; stealing or trafficking in
weapons or ammunition; pimping; abducting and selling human beings;
and passing on "criminal methods., 33
28 Id. arts. 91-97, 100-01.
29 Id. arts. 106, 110.
30 Id. arts. 132, 139.
31 Id. arts. 150, 155.
32 Id. art. 175.
33 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the Severe
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3. Economic crimes
In the early 1980s the government launched a campaign to crack
down on its perceived rise in economic crimes. In 1982 the People's
Daily commented that, "[t]he government and the Party have always ad-
vocated using capital punishment as little as possible but the shocking
incidence of economic crimes has reached such proportions that they
must be seriously punished. A small minority of extremely serious
criminals must be punished by means of the ultimate penalty in order to
serve as a warning to others."34
The following month, Deng Xiaoping called attention to the grow-
ing problem of economic crime. In a speech to the Politburo, Deng said
that in order to, "break the force of this ill wind," the authorities must
take "prompt, strict and stern measures," including, in the case of "par-
ticularly grave" crimes, the "ultimate penalty."35 The emergence of
these "new exploiters" who began to "engage in corruption, embezzle-
ment, speculation and profiteering," had come to Deng's notice first in
1979.36
Because economic crimes had become "rampant," an amendment to
the Criminal Law adopted in March 1982 decreed, when the circum-
stances are "particularly serious," heavier punishment (including the
death penalty) was required for smuggling; speculation; habitual theft or
swindling; drug-trafficking; bribery; and the theft and illegal export of
"precious cultural relics."'37 As a result of this campaign and new law,
death penalties were reportedly handed out in a "few" serious cases; one
party official in a Guangdong prefecture embezzled large quantities of
goods and accepted bribes worth almost 70,000 yuan.38 Interestingly,
this campaign in China mirrored the Soviet Union's effort against eco-
nomic crimes in the early 1960s. During that campaign the courts also
issued death sentences quite readily, and the seriousness of the crimes
involved varied significantly.39
Punishment of Criminal Elements Who Seriously Endanger Public Security, reprinted in CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 241-42.
34 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
57 (1984).
35 Combat Economic Crime, SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982) 381 (1984).
36 Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, supra note 25, at 176.
37 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the Severe
Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Erode the Economy, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 229-30.
38 Jiang Hua 6th NPC Work Report on Court (Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service Report), June
25, 1983 [hereinafter Sixth NPC Work Report], in FBIS, June 27, 1983, at K2-K3.
39 See Willets, The Wages of Economic Sin, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1962, at
26-32.
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4. Offenses by the military
Ten crimes that carry the death penalty refer specifically to mem-
bers of the armed forces. Under the Provisional Regulations of the PRC
on "Punishing Servicemen Who Commit Offenses Against Their Duties"
passed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in
June 1981 these include providing military secrets to enemies or foreign-
ers; threats or violence against army personnel on duty; weapons or
equipment thievery; sabotage; spreading rumors undermining army mo-
rale; desertion; disobedience; making false reports; assisting the enemy
after surrendering; and robbing and harming civilians.4°
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Hong Kong
The legality of criminal charges is assessed before individuals are
arraigned before a judge. A barrister and solicitor represent individuals
charged with a crime carrying the death penalty; their case is then heard
by a jury of their peers. In Hong Kong a jury consists of seven or nine
persons who must speak and understand English (which is presently the
official language of the court system in the territory). The jury must
reach a unanimous verdict of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in such
cases before a judge can mete out capital punishment.4'
The defendant may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals of
the Supreme Court in Hong Kong. Anytime the death penalty is passed,
the territory's Executive Council-comprised of some dozen members of
the Hong Kong government's most senior officials and presided over by
the Governor-reviews the sentence with the help of a report prepared
by the judge who passed the sentence.42 The Governor may grant a con-
demned man a pardon or reprieve "upon receiving the advice of the Ex-
ecutive Council," but the final decision is made "according to his own
deliberate judgment." Thus, the Governor is free to take or leave council
members' views. In the event that he reaches a decision that a majority
of the Executive Council opposes, the Governor must enter "at length"
into the minutes of the meeting the reasons for the decision.4 3
If the Governor-in-Council upholds a death sentence, the con-
demned can lodge an appeal in London with the Queen-in-Council, the
British sovereign in consultation with the Judicial Committee of the
40 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
57.
41 2 V. A. PENLINGTON, LAW IN HONG KONG: AN INTRODUCTION 48 (2d ed. 1986).
42 See N. MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 81, 86 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter N. MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS].
43 Id.
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Privy Council.' As a last resort, the condemned may directly appeal for
mercy to the Queen. The British head-of-state then acts on the advice of
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who must
take into consideration the sense of Parliament-the body to which the
minister is answerable.45
The modus operandi is hanging, although the last hanging in Hong
Kong occurred in November 1966.46 As a rule, the Governor commutes
all death sentences passed by the courts in the territory. 7 In one in-
stance in 1973, however, he refused to grant such a reprieve. Twenty-
nine year old Tsoi Kwok-cheong was convicted of fatally stabbing an off-
duty auxiliary police constable during a botched robbery. At the time
Hong Kong was in midst of a government-sponsored anti-crime cam-
paign, and the Governor almost certainly felt a reprieve would make a
mockery of the campaign and probably result in a serious loss of confi-
dence and respect for the government by the people of the territory.
Tsoi, assisted by his solicitor, appealed directly to the Queen for mercy.
The British sovereign, upon the advice of her Foreign Secretary, com-
muted Tsoi's sentence to life imprisonment.48
There have been 128 death sentences passed in Hong Kong since
1976 (Table 1); all were for murder. The annual proportion of the total
criminal cases in which the death penalty has been invoked in the terri-
tory.since 1978 has remained constant at approximately 1%. During the
past eleven years, approximately 11 criminals per year have received
death sentences. The death sentences handed out during the past nine
years have fluctuated between .13 per 100,000 inhabitants and .35 per
100,000 inhabitants. The last person to hang in Hong Kong was Wong
Kai-kei, who was convicted of murdering a department store security
guard.49 Following Wong's execution on November 16, 1966 at Stanley
Prison, all persons condemned to death have had their sentences com-
muted. The British Parliament passed the Murder (Abolition of the
Death Penalty) Act of 1965 that abolished the death penalty for murder
in the United Kingdom.50 Two years later the British Labour govern-
ment made it clear to the Hong Kong administration it would no longer
44 V.A. PENLINGTON, supra note 41, at 50.
45 N. MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, supra note 42, at 90-91.
46 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 10, at 79.
47 N. MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, supra note 42, at 87.
48 For details of the incident, see id. at 86-87, 290. The action of the Foreign Secretary in
overruling the Governor's decision was "completely unprecedented." See Miners, The Governor,
The Secretary of State and the Perogative of Mercy, 17 HONG KONG L.J. 77, 86-89 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Miners, The Governor].
49 S. China Morning Post (Hong Kong), Nov. 17, 1966, at 8, col. 3.
50 The death penalty still exists in the United Kingdom for treason and certain forms of piracy,
as well as for acts committed by members of the armed forces during times of war. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 139.
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TABLE 1
Death Sentences in Hong Kong and Related Statistics, 1976-1987
death sentences death sentences
death criminal per 100,000 as percent of
year sentences population' cases inhabitants criminal cases
1976 13 4,379,000 1,099 0.30 1.2
1977 8 4,477,600 987 0.18 0.8
1978 10 4,566,900 982 0.22 1.0
1979 8 4,720,200 1,124 0.17 0.7
1980 8 5,017,000 1,321 0.16 0.6
1981 18 5,147,900 1,453 0.35 1.2
1982 14 5,207,000 1,438 0.27 1.0
1983 11 5,287,800 1,585 0.21 0.7
1984 7 5,344,400 1,582 0.13 0.4
1985 12 5,397,500 1,621 0.22 0.7
1986 15 5,466,900 1,749 0.27 0.9
1987 4
(Jan.-June.)
End of year figures for previous year.
SOURCE: Statistics for population and criminal cases see HONG KONG 1978, HONG KONG 1979,
HONG KONG 1980, HONG KONG 1981, HONG KONG 1982, HONG KONG 1983, HONG KONG 1984,
HONG KONG 1985, HONG KONG 1986, AND HONG KONG 1987 (Hong Kong: Government Printer,
1979 - 1987). Criminal cases are the total of high court civil sessions and criminal jurisdictions of
the district courts. I am indebted to Hong Kong Supreme Court Justice, Judge J.E. Hopkinson for
statistics on the number of death sentences.
permit executions to be carried out in the territory. All major political
parties in the United Kingdom are against the death penalty and in 1975
the Governor at the time, Sir Murray MacLehose (today Lord
MacLehose), set an important precedent when he indicated-through his
Colonial Secretary-that in the future, when a Governor commutes a
death sentence, a lesser sentence of life imprisonment without possibility
of parole will always be imposed.51
B. China
The public security bureau is responsible for "investigation, deten-
tion and preparatory examination of criminal cases." The people's
procuratorate approves the arrest, conducts investigations and prosecutes
the suspect. Under article 3 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the people's
courts adjudicate cases. This entails four stages: investigation, debate,
51 N. MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, supra note 42, at 87, 90-91 n.30.
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appraisal by the collegiate bench and the judgment." According to arti-
cle 125 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the ac-
cused has the right to defend himself. 3 The Criminal Procedure Law
allows the defendant, a lawyer or layman to represent him (articles 26
and 27). However, the burden of proof lies with the defendant who must
prove his innocence, or lack of criminal responsibility or guilt for a lesser
crime (article 28)." 4 A lawyer is expected to "be loyal to the interest of
the socialist cause and the people," 5 ; defense lawyers in China, as Shao-
Chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu conclude, "generally play a passive role
in court proceedings."56
The intermediate people's courts have original jurisdiction over
cases where there may be a sentence of life imprisonment or death. 7
Cases are tried by a panel of one judge and two people's assessors; in
cases of appeal or protest three to five judges preside.5 8 The panel re-
views the evidence, hears witnesses and then adjourns to deliberate. The
verdict should be pronounced within six weeks after the start of the
trial 9 but from 1981 to 1983 the amount of time was waived in certain
circumstances.' Execution occurs by shooting.61 From 1981 to 1983,
where the accused had been sentenced to death-except for counterrevo-
lutionary offenses and crimes of corruption-the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress decided that the Supreme People's Court
need not approve if the high people's court of the province, autonomous
region or municipality gave its approval, or if the defendant did not
appeal. 62
In June 1981 the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress passed legislation amending article 13 of the Criminal Procedure
52 S.C. LENG & H. CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND Docu-
MENTS 91 (1985).
53 XIANFA (Constitution) art. 125 (People's Republic of China) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.]
(adopted on Dec. 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People's Congress at its Fifth Session).
54 Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 15 [hereinafter Criminal
Procedure of China], reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE OF CHINA, supra note 21.
55 S.C. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 272; see also Address by Vice Premier Qiao Shi,
Strive to Build a Socialist Lawyer System with Chinese Characteristics (July 5, 1986, First National
Congress of Lawyers), reprinted in FBIS, July 14, 1986, at K26-K28.
56 S.C. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 95.
57 Criminal Procedure Law of China, art. 15.
58 Id. art. 105.
59 Id. art. 125.
60 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the Ques-
tion of the Time Limits for Handling Criminal Cases, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 226-27.
61 Criminal Law of China, art. 45.
62 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the Ques-
tion of Approval of Cases Involving Death Sentences, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 217-18.
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Law, making permanent the above reform of the approval process. This
change allows the Supreme People's Court to defer its approval power of
death sentences "when necessary" to supreme courts of the respective
provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities.63 Amnesty Interna-
tional cites two cases in which execution occurred in an incredibly swift
manner. 64
In September 1983, the Standing Committee shortened the time
limit for an appeal by death row inmates from the ten days stipulated by
article 131 of the Criminal Procedure Law of 1979 to three days.6 5 Ac-
cording to the Law of Criminal Procedure, the accused has the right to
an appeal (article 129). Only one death sentence case known to Amnesty
International was successfully appealed since the law became effective in
1980.66 Further, article 80 of the Constitution of the People's Republic
of China bestows upon the State president the power to issue pardons to
convicted criminals,67 but there is no record of any such appeal ever be-
ing made to the highest office in the land.68
Condemned criminals have received degrading treatment prior to
execution, with scant regard shown for basic human dignity. Death row
prisoners are often paraded though streets in flatbed trucks, heads cowed
with signs hanging around their necks listing their names, crimes and
capital sentences.69 According to the Criminal Procedure Law of 1979,
death sentences are to be announced publicly but should not be imple-
mented in "public view."'7 However, reports have detailed cases of pub-
lic executions, some even shown on television.71 At the height of the
anti-crime campaign some prisoners were removed from their cells for
63 Id.
64 In 1983 a man was executed only eight days after he was supposed to have committed the
crime. In another case that same year, two men were executed less than a week after their arrest.
Within six days, they were tried and sentenced, had their sentences approved by the Provincial High
People's Court and were then executed. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 69.
65 See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the
Procedure for Rapid Adjudication of Cases Involving Criminal Elements who Seriously Endanger
Public Security, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 246-47.
66 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS supra note 2, at
66-67.
67 See P.R.C. CONST. art. 80.
68 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
71.
69 See, e.g., A Glimpse of China's Hidden Face of Fear in the Killing Fields, S. China Morning
Post, July 19, 1987, at 9. The "humiliating treatment of condemned prisoners" in China is a serious
concern of Amnesty International. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 1987, at 227-28 (1987).
70 See Criminal Procedure Law of China, art. 155.
71 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
Vol. 20:147
DEATH PENALTY- IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-1997
execution without being informed of their imminent demise. Some death
row inmates reportedly left their belongings, including half-eaten or un-
touched food, expecting to consume these morsels upon returning.72
In addition, Chinese courts have applied new death penalty regula-
tions retroactively. Thus in some instances, as Ammesty International
has documented, a person convicted of a crime committed prior to the
crime being designated as a capital offense has been sentenced to death
and executed. In 1983, for example, four men were convicted of robbing
a Guangdong store in July and they were executed for the crime on Sep-
tember 4th. The amendment under which they had apparently been sen-
tenced to die had only been approved by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on September 2nd.7 3
A unique feature of Chinese law, as outlined in article 43 of the
Criminal Law of 1979, is the suspended death sentence.7 4 Under this
provision a convicted criminal can be given a death sentence that is sus-
pended for two years. If, at the end of that time period, the prisoner has
shown remorse and proper attitude, the sentence can be reduced in the
collegiate panel's discretion. If the condemned "truly repents," his sen-
tence can be reduced to life imprisonment. In addition, if the prisoner
demonstrates "meritorious service," he can be sentenced to fifteen to
twenty years behind bars. However, if there is "verified evidence" that
the prisoner has during the course of two years, "resisted reform in an
odious manner," upon approval of the Supreme People's Court, the exe-
cution can be carried out.7
The suspended death sentence emphasizes the crime's magnitude-
that it is heinous enough to merit execution-while at the same time
demonstrating the court's mercy. Apparently a suspended death sen-
tence rarely is carried out following the two year period of assessment of
the individual's behavior and attitude. Evidence suggests that the sus-
pended death sentence enjoys extensive usage.76 Article 46 of the Crimi-
nal Law and article 153 of the Criminal Procedure law are written in
such a way that even if the prisoner resists reform, he can avoid execu-
tion. The only requirement is that the prisoner should not resist in an
"odious manner. ' 77
72 Z. Zhang, A Look Back to Forget-A Record of the 1983 Anti-Crime Campaign, CHINA
SPRING DIG., July-Aug. 1974, at 31-33.
73 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 61
(1984).
74 See Criminal Procedure Law of China, art. 43.
75 Criminal Law of China, art. 46.
76 See, eg., Z.G. An, On Capital Punishment, BEUING REV., Nov. 7, 1983, at 4 (editorial); S.C.
LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 132.
77 Criminal Law of China, art. 46; Criminal Procedure Law of China, art. 153. See also Co-
HEN, supra note 11, at 537-38.
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Those who have not attained age eighteen cannot be given the
straight sentence of death, but youths sixteen and seventeen can receive a
suspended death sentence if the crime committed is "particularly
grave."'78 It is not clear if, under certain circumstances, the same could
be true for a pregnant woman. Execution might be permitted after her
child is born. 79
The best known cases of suspended death sentences are those of
Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao, a former Vice Pre-
mier-both got suspended death sentences in 1981. These two members
of the Gang of Four were assessed to have repented and had their
sentences commuted two years later to life imprisonment.
According to the judgment handed down against the group of ten
defendants, the Gang of Four and six other former senior officials in the
government, Communist Party and army, were convicted of crimes in-
cluding plotting to "subvert the government and overthrow the people's
democratic dictatorship," and responsibility for the murders of more
than thirty persons identified individually by name as well as for the
death of many others.8 0 Jiang and Zhang were given death sentences
"with a two year reprieve and permanent deprivation of political
rights."'" Political crimes, particularly those committed by high level
leaders appear to be dealt with less severely than those of lower officials.
Regarding Jiang and Zhang, it is unclear whether there existed, in Leo
Goodstadt's words, "evidence of repentance." 2 Upon the expiration of
the two year suspended sentences in January 1983, the "collegiate
bench" formed by the Supreme People's Court found that both defend-
ants "did not in any flagrant way resist reform."8s3 Ross Terrill concludes
in his biography of Jiang Qing that despite the ruling by the bench, she
had "not repented."8 4
This raises the question of whether individuals convicted of crimes
carrying the death penalty can expect equality before the law. In post-
Mao China, treatment of a convicted criminal is no longer determined by
his class background. Rather, he is to be judged by the "extent of harm
78 Criminal Law of China, art. 44.
79 According to the lectures given in 1957, there is a precedent for a pregnant woman being
sentenced to death with her execution being delayed until one year following the birth of her child.
See COHEN, supra note 11, at 538.
80 A GREAT TRIAL IN CHINESE HISTORY: THE TRIAL OF THE LIN BIAO AND JIANG QING
COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY CLIQUES, Nov. 1980-JAN. 1981 219 (1981).
81 Id. at 233.
82 L. Goodstadt, The Trial of the Lin-Jiang Cliques: China's Return to Rule of Law?, 12 HONG
KONG L.J. 53 (1982).
83 Sixth NPC Work Report, supra note 38, at K2-K3.
84 R. TERRILL, THE WHITE-BONED DEMON: A BIOGRAPHY OF MADAM MAO ZEDONG 393
(1984).
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to society and by the nature of the crime."' 85 Article 4 of the Criminal
Procedure Law states that, "The law is equally applicable to all citizens,
and no special privilege whatever is permissible."86 The evidence, partic-
ularly with regard to the use of the death penalty, is not convincing. If
convicted of crimes carrying the death penalty, high level government
and party officials and their offspring are treated more leniently than
common criminals.87 Aside from a few highly publicized executions,
e.g., the grandson of Marshal Zhu De in 1983 for rape and other of-
fenses,8 8 there seems to be one set of laws for officials and another for
others.
Beijing does not make public the official number of death sentences
and executions in China. Available figures are sporadic, and rough esti-
mates are made by such organizations as Amnesty International and the
U.S. Department of State. These estimates are compiled from formal
and informal remarks by PRC officials, specific cases reported in the
mainland media, public notices of executions posted in Chinese cities and
eyewitness accounts of public executions and sentencings. The Associate
Director of China's Bureau of Reform Through Labor divulged in No-
vember 1986 to an Agence France Presse correspondent that since the
start of the anti-crime campaign in 1983, 624,000 offenders had been exe-
cuted or sentenced to prison terms of five or more years. The official
refused to disclose the exact number of executions; the AFP report re-
sorted to citing figures of between 10,000 and 30,000 executions during
the past three years-these are Western diplomats' estimates.8 9
Amnesty International recorded 600 executions from August 1983
to October 1983 (the initial phase of the anti-crime campaign) and be-
lieves that the actual number of executions for the entire country during
that period was "far higher."90 According to a report on the work of
Supreme People's Court, more than 2,900 death sentences were appealed
to the court from 1978-1982.91 If one assumes all of these appeals were
unsuccessful and that this number represents all cases in China during
this period involving crimes punishable by death (i.e. all were appealed to
the Supreme People's Court), then one can estimate the proportion of
criminal cases in which the death penalty was employed. On this basis,
85 S.C. LENG & H. CHIu, supra note 52, at 104 (excerpt from 1979 HONGQI article).
86 Criminal Procedure Law of China, art. 4.
87 This is also the general conclusion of S. Leng and H. Chiu. See S.C. LENG & H. CHIU, supra
note 52, at 108.
88 See id; Beiing Mayor Confirms Execution of Zhu De's Grandson, Hsin Pao, Nov. 30, 1983,
in FBIS, Dec. 1, 1983 at W3-W4.
89 Anti-Crime Drive Jails 624,000 Since 1983, supra note 17, at K1.
90 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
54-55.
. 91 Sixth NPC Work Report, supra note 38, at K3.
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only 0.3% of total criminals tried during 1978-1982 received the death
penalty.92 From 1983-1986 the U.S. Department of State estimates ex-
ecutions at between 7,000 and 14,000.93 During this five year period, the
rate of executions- and death sentences if one assumes that that all
death sentences were carried out-was between 0.17 executions per
100,000 inhabitants and 0.34 per 100,000 inhabitants.94
A majority of the crimes committed by those executed in the PRC
were violent. Statistics collected during 1979-80 reveal that "most" ex-
ecutions during that period were for the crimes of t.ape and murder.95 A
Taiwan source collected data on more than 250 executions carried out on
the PRC from August 23, 1983 to September 30, 1983. Some 80% of the
executions for which adequate data were given, the crimes committed
were of a violent nature.
96
But there have also been executions for non-violent crimes. During
the past three years there have been executions for such crimes as fraud,
drug smuggling, and holding "dance and sex parties." 97 In October 1987
a man was sentenced to death by the Taiyuan City Intermediate Court
after being convicted of snatching a woman's purse in a park.
98
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-1997 HONG KONG
Will the uneven and extensive use of the death penalty in China
today be "reflected" in the HKSAR of tomorrow? Basic Law planners
can play an instrumental role in determining how much, if any, con-
tinuity or change there will be from the current Hong Kong criminal
justice system in the new HKSAR. After that, it will essentially be up to
whether Beijing stands by the letter of the Draft Agreement and the Ba-
sic Law. Three basic factors should determine the scope of the death
penalty in post-1997 Hong Kong: meddling by Beijing, the influence of
Chinese cultural values and the legacy of British law.
92 See also J. DOMES, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC: A TIME OF TRANsI-
TION 226 (1985).
93 STATE DEP'T, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986, 100TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. 684 (J. Comm. Print 1987).
94 These rates should be considered rough estimates since they were calculated from the State
Department estimates, id. and figures cited in STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, ZHONGGUO TONGJI
ZHAIYAO, 1987, at 16 (1987).
95 S.C. LENG & H. CHIU, supra note 52, at 132.
96 Recent Wave of Executions in Red China, INSIDE MAINLAND CHINA, Nov. 1983, at 11-14.
97 See, eg., Criminal Executed For "Profiteering" in Guangdong (Xinhua News Agency, June
8, 1987) in FBIS, June 9, 1987 at P1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL RE-
PORT, 1986, at 1 (1986).
98 J.M. Zhou, Taibao Luo Peiliang Taiyuan Zaoyu Jishi, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily over-
seas ed.), Dec. 11, 1987, at 4.
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A. The Meddling Factor
Although Beijing insists that Hong Kong's criminal law will remain
unchanged, currently legal matters in all autonomous counties, prefec-
tures and regions in China are circumscribed by the application of consti-
tution and law of the PRC.99 How autonomous the HKSAR will be is
open to debate, but certainly there is bound to be some degree of med-
dling by Beijing in the territory's affair, whether it be of a subtle or not-
so-subtle nature. Quite possibly, the Chinese government will encourage
vigorous use of the death penalty for violent crimes and serious cases of
white collar (economic) crimes. One reason is to appease the conserva-
tives in the Beijing leadership who are unsympathetic to the "one coun-
try, two systems" policy that allows Hong Kong to remain a capitalist
enclave. This encouragement would materialize, if at all, subtly and
would probably not meet with much opposition in the HKSAR
legislature.
Political crimes (or in PRC terminology, "counterrevolutionary
crimes") are another matter. Few of the recent death sentences and ex-
ecutions in China were for political crimes,1"0 but rather for violent or
severe ones. Many of the death sentences were handed out for what also
would be considered grave offenses in Western countries. In 1986, the
U.S. Department of State estimated that the "great majority" of those
thought to have been executed by the mainland authorities since August
1983 were convicted of "serious nonpolitical crimes."' 0 The most glar-
ing example of counterrevolutionaries receiving the death sentence are
the two members of the Gang of Four already noted above-and these
were both commuted. While few of the crimes committed on the main-
land are counterrevolutionary types-reportedly less than 1% 102-- and
there are far more likely to be greater numbers of such persons in Hong
Kong. There are many Taiwah sympathizers and numerous residents
with ties overseas, and thriving religious communities in the territory, 10 3
99 A. Chen, Further Aspects of the Autonomy of Hong Kong under the PRC Constitution, 14
HONG KONG L.J. 341, 346-47 (1984).
100 However, for several examples of counterrevolutionaries who received the death penalty,
see S.C. LANG & H. CHIu, supra note 52, at 146.
101 STATE DEP'T, supra note 93, at 738.
102 This was the figure for 1982 given by Jiang Hua, president of the Supreme People's court.
Sixth NPC Work Report, supra note 38, at K9. For a concise discussion of statistics for the number
of political crimes and an estimate of the number of political prisoners in China in the mid-1980s, see
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 5-6.
103 What implications 1997 will have for Hong Kong clergy and religious adherents, particu-
larly for Roman Catholics, is a provocative question. The church's obeisance to a foreign head of
state, the Pope, is at the root of the matter. The Catholic Church in the PRC officially severed all
ties with the Vatican more than thirty years ago. Under government supervision, Chinese Catholics
formed a separate organization called the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which is independ-
ent of the Vatican. One of the most persecuted religious groups in communist China has been the
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not to mention well entrenched and sophisticated organized crime
networks.
The vital question is how far Beijing will insist on increased vigi-
lance against counterrevolutionaries in the region and increased severity
against convicted offenders. Beijing values its image in the West as a
rational, mature member of the world community and is particularly sen-
sitive to criticism of human rights violations-witness defensiveness over
criticism about the tactics used in the aggressive birth control campaign,
and more recently, over resolutions passed in the U.S. Congress to crack-
down on counterrevolutionaries in Hong Kong concerning Tibet.' 04
Thus any efforts should be limited in scope and focused on particularly
heinous cases.
Further, Beijing would like to make reunification more attractive to
the Nationalist government on Taiwan. By appearing moderate, toler-
ant, and adhering to a hands-off policy toward Hong Kong, it strength-
ens this image. Reunification is one of three major national goals
identified by Deng Xiaoping,101 and the likelihood of Taiwan confederat-
ing itself with the mainland will weigh in any decision by Beijing to visi-
bly intervene in Hong Kong in any sphere. Also, the Beijing leadership
would not want to damage the confidence of the Hong Kong business
community that has presided over the territory's phenomenal economic
success. Meddling in laws and the legal process of the HKSAR to crack
down on counterrevolutionaries would likely lead to a flight of en-
trepreneurial talent and capital, severely crippling the territory and les-
sening its value to Beijing's efforts at economic modernization. Indeed,
some members of the business community might consider themselves a
prime candidate-under Beijing's definitions-for prosecution as
counterrevolutionaries. 106
Catholic clergy and laymen who have refused to renounce their allegiance to the Pope. While none
of these appear to have been sentenced to death, many may have endured long prison terms. See
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 14-15, 19-
20, 45-48, 50-51.
104 For an earlier example of Beijing's concern about world opinion, see Z.G. An, Truth of
Executing Criminals in Tibet, BEIJING REv., Oct. 17, 1983, at 5 (editorial). This piece stresses that
six persons, including two members of the Tibetan nationality executed in Lhasa just prior to Oct. 1,
1983, were not dissidents as claimed by the Tibetan government-in-exile, but in fact hardened
criminals.
105 See Opening Speech At The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC, in SELECTED WORKS OF
DENG XIAOPING (1975-1982) 396.
106 A number of Hong Kong residents have been arrested during visits to the mainland for
allegedly committing crimes in China. Apparently some of these arrests have been for counterrevo-
lutionary offenses. Relatives of these persons in Hong Kong typically have not been informed of the
arrests, the charges against the accused, or the dates of their trials. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 49-50 (the case of Liu Shuqing).
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B. The Culture Factor
Chinese civilization possesses a strongly held cultural value of main-
taining social order and harmony. While this characteristic is not unique
to Chinese culture, Chinese society and governments have historically
been particularly intent on perpetuating this. China boasts one of the
oldest legal traditions in the world, and imperial China had a very com-
prehensive set of punishments covering almost every conceivable infrac-
tion. Some penalties were particularly brutal and capital punishment
was an integral part of the criminal code.107
How is the death penalty likely to be utilized? As more and more
expatriate judges, ba-risters and solicitors retire and are replaced, will the
attitudes of the Hong Kong legal community shift increasingly toward
vigorous use of the death penalty? There is every indication that the
death penalty will be readily sought after and implemented, especially for
violent crimes.
Who is to say whether of their own initiative or under pressure from
the mainland, Hong Kong lawmakers might revise the statutes pertain-
ing to the death penalty or add new crimes to those already punishable
by a sentence of death. Perhaps, merely the evolution of the legal code in
Hong Kong will alter the status of the death penalty. Albert Chen con-
cludes that apart from constitutional law, "other areas," including crimi-
nal law "will remain basically unchanged in framework" and will
experience only "normal and natural growth" '0 8-- that which is neces-
sary to adapt to "changing conditions. '109 Also, if the Chinese language
is raised on par with English in the legal system and comes to dominate
all proceedings, will this alter the atmosphere of common law in Hong
Kong?"10
A general consensus exists among Hong Kong people of capital
punishment's suitability for particularly violent crimes. Most unofficial
members of the Legislative Council-Hong Kong's lawmaking body-
favor the death penalty for murder. A postal survey conducted by the
University of Hong Kong in the mid-1970s showed that an overwhelm-
ing majority of the respondents favored the death penalty for premedi-
tated murder. Of 500 responses, more than 90% voted for capital
107 The so-called "Ten Abominations," for example (which included such crimes as treason
and "unfilial conduct"), carried the severest punishment known in the criminal code of Qing Dy-
nasty: death by slicing. IL SMITH, CHINA'S CULTURAL HERITAGE: THE CH'ING DYNASTY, 1644-
1912, at 240 (1983). See also D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967) (an over-
view of the criminal punishment system in Imperial China).
108 A. Chen, Preliminary Suggestions on the Political System of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region, in HONG KONG IN TRANSITION 116 (J. Cheng ed. 1986).
109 Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § II.
110 For a discussion of the issue of language and law, see A. Chen, 1997: The Language of the
Law in Hong Kong, 15 HONG KONG L.J. 19 (1985).
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punishment; a majority also supported extending the death penalty for
bodily harm, armed robbery and rape."'
C. The British Legacy Factor
Will such principles as the independence of the judiciary or the pre-
sumption of innocence-long established in British legal tradition-sur-
vive in post-1997 Hong Kong? One would hope that one legacy of the
British presence in the territory will be its legal tradition that has formed
the bedrock of the law in so many former British possessions around the
world. As regards the death penalty, there will be a major change in the
appeals procedure that since 1966 has ensured all death sentences are not
implemented. Annex I of the Joint Declaration states that the system of
appeal to the Privy Council in London will be abolished and the "power
of the final adjudication" will rest with an appeals court within the
HKSAR. 12
- While what might be regarded as the best safeguard to vigorous use
of the death penalty will be gone after 1997, there are other possible
means through which British legal tradition may exert a moderating in-
fluence. Legal experts and workers from Commonwealth countries and
other states will be permitted to participate in the HKSAR legal system.
The draft agreement states that the final court of appeal in post-1997
Hong Kong "may as required invite judges from other common law ju-
risdictions" to sit on this appellate court, and that the government of the
HKSAR can permit lawyers from "outside" Hong Kong to "work and
practice" in the territory. Further, the courts are permitted by the draft
I1I See MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, supra note 42, at 185, 189. See also Joint
Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § III. A small sample of Hong Kong people surveyed on the
subject in 1973 indicated that residents were "strongly in favor" of retaining and utilizing the death
penalty for convicted murderers. See Choy, Survey Shows What People Think. Death for Killers, S.
China Morning Post, Apr. 29, 1973, at 2. In 1975, the Colonial Secretary stated that the Governor
was aware of the "fierceness of the conviction" that Hong Kong residents held concerning the neces-
sity of using the death penalty. See MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, supra note 42, at 90.
112 For the view of unofficial Legislative Councillors, see MINERS, GOVERNMENT AND POLI-
TICS, supra note 42, at 185. On public opinion, see id. at 189; P. B. Harris, The British Parliament,
The University of Hong Kong and the Death Penalty, (unpublished manuscript, 1975). Although
the survey sample consists solely of university students, Harris concludes that the attitudes of the
general public would, if anything, be harsher (more disposed toward employing capital punishment).
See id. at 4, 7. (I am indebted to Professor N.J. Miners of the Department of Political Science at the
University of Hong Kong for bringing the above manuscript to my attention.) A small sample of
Hong Kong people surveyed on the subject in 1973 also found that residents were "strongly in
favor" of retaining and using the death penalty for convicted murderers. See P. Choy, Survey Shows
What The Public Thinks: "Death for Killers", Sunday Post-Herald, Apr. 29, 1973, at 2. In 1975 the
Colonial Secretary stated that the Governor was aware of the "fierceness of the conviction" that
Hong Kong residents held concerning the necessity of using the death penalty. See MINERS, Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS, supra note 42, at 90 n.30.
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agreement to decide cases with reference to "precedents in other com-
mon law jurisdictions."' 13
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the difference between British-style and
PRC-style justice in Hong Kong has been significant. It has probably
meant the difference between life and death for 128 convicted criminals
(and possibly more) since 1976. One can estimate the number of death
sentences that might have been passed in the territory during 1983-1986
by using the rates of executions per 100,000 persons calculated above for
China. This means of comparison focuses attention on the crux of this
article's issue: what would be the real difference in life and death terms
between Hong Kong under the present legal system and the territory
under socialist PRC law? Using the lowest figure of executions estimated
by the Department of State, thirty-six executions would have taken place
between 1983-1986. Using the highest estimate, seventy-two executions
would have occurred. If all of those sentenced to hang in Hong Kong
during the same period had actually been executed, then forty-five indi-
viduals would have been put to death in the territory. The low estimate
is nine less than what the actual figure would have been, while the high
estimate is seventeen above this."' It is important to remember, of
course, that the key factor in avoiding any executions was the constitu-
tional link between Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. That link will
be severed in 1997.
A survey of the status of the death penalty in contemporary Hong
Kong and China serves as an interesting case study, demonstrating the
contrast between two different legal systems and philosophies of law.
Undoubtedly, as the HKSAR government is "unlikely to share Hong
Kong's present reservations on capitol punishment", the HKSAR legal
system will contain provisions for the use of capital punishment and it
will almost certainly be utilized.' 5 With or without pressure from main-
land sources, if the wishes of the people of the HKSAR are taken into
account, the death penalty will enjoy new life in post-1997 Hong Kong.
Perhaps only the instrument of execution to be used in the HKSAR may
be in doubt: a rope or a revolver?
113 Id.
114 These projected rates for Hong Kong are calculated by using the rates of executions per
100,000 inhabitants discussed supra note 86 as applied to the population figures of the STATE STA-
TISTICAL BUREAU, supra note 94, at 16 (Table 1).
I 15 Death Sentence Shock for HK, S. China Morning Post, May 27, 1986, at 2.
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